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Selection, as it is traditionally interpreted represents a critical
human resource intervention in any organisation in as far as it
regulates the movement of employees into, through and out of
the organisation. As such selection firstly represents a
potentially powerful instrument through which the human
resource function can add value to the organisation (Boudreau,
1991; Cascio, 1991b; Cronshaw and Alexander, 1985). However,
selection secondly also represents a relatively visible
mechanism through which access to employment
opportunities is regulated. Because of this latter aspect,
selection, more than any other human resource intervention,
has been singled out for intense scrutiny from the perspective
of fairness and affirmative action (Arvey & Faley, 1988;
Milkovich & Boudreau, 1994). More specifically the use of
psychometric tests in personnel selection has been regarded
with an extraordinary degree of suspicion and scepticism. This
is especially true if selection occurs in respect of a diverse
applicant group. In South Africa this seems to be true not only
for labour representatives and government officials, but also
for quite a number of human resource management
professionals. The problem is not that the use of psychometric
tests in personnel selection is being challenged as such. Rather
the concern lies in the seemingly uncritical embracing of
specific tenets regarding the use of psychometric tests in
personnel selection in the absence of any systematic coherent
psychometric argument to justify these beliefs. The absence of
such a supporting psychometric rationale seems unfortunate
because it prevents the independent critical evaluation of the
psychometric merits of these generally accepted beliefs and it
most likely would stifle an open-minded, creative search for
effective and equitable selection practices. Efficient and
equitable personnel selection in respect of a diverse applicant
pool is a complex present-day human resource management
problem that requires a mature, creative and innovative
response from the Industrial Organisational Psychology
fraternity in South Africa that acknowledges the intricacies and
complexities inherent to the problem. In addition, the danger
exists that the manner in which the Industrial Organisational
Psychology fraternity in South Africa responds to the challenge
in the popular press, academic literature and conference papers
(mea culpa) could perpetuate and reinforce the somewhat
superficial, black box, non-analytical approach one typically
finds regarding the problem.
The following seems to be some of the more prominent beliefs
that seem to have developed in South Africa as psychometric
dogma that apparently guides the day-to-day responses of many
human resource management professionals in their use of
psychometric tests in the work place.
 It is possible to assure selection fairness solely through the
judicious choice of selection instruments. Or in its alternative
formulation, it is possible to avoid unfair discrimination in
personnel selection solely through the use of reliable, valid
and unbiased selection instruments (i.e., instruments that are
free from measurement bias);
 It is possible to avoid biased assessments/measures through
the judicious choice of properly developed selection
instruments;
 It is possible to avoid adverse impact through the judicious
choice of assessment/selection instruments. Or in its alter-
native formulation, it is possible to grade selection instruments
in terms of the degree of adverse impact they create;
 Adverse impact should be equated with unfair discrimination;
and
 It is possible to certify assessment techniques as Employment
Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) compliant.
Informal observation seems to suggest that a significant number
of human resource management professionals in South Africa
would endorse all of the above claims. It seems as if in the mind
of many human resource management professionals there exists
the belief that if they were sufficiently cautious and fastidious in
their choice of selection instruments they could gain
psychometric salvation and immunity from the Employment
Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998). More specifically the
belief seems to be that selection procedures will not discriminate
unfairly against members of previously disadvantaged groups
nor will they create adverse impact against such groups as long
as the selection instruments used in these procedures are valid
and provide unbiased measures of the intended latent variable
(Sehlapelo & Terre Blanche in Bredell, van Eeden & van Staden,
1999; Van der Merwe, 1999; Van der Merwe, 2002; Visser & De
Jong, 2000). Humphreys (1986, p. 327) makes a similar
observation in the context of the USA:
A civil rights activist who looks at this literature and listens to
psychologists at meetings might well conclude that minority
problems in admission to higher education, hiring in
industry, and classification in military services will be solved
when bias is eliminated from tests.
Although Humphreys (1986) refers to both measurement bias
and predictive bias in this observation, he nonetheless then goes
on (p. 327) to comment:
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Many have implicitly assumed that a test composed of
unbiased items will also be unbiased in the first (predictive)
sense, but the two types of bias can frequently be quit
independent or even opposite to each other.
The Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998)
seems to echo the foregoing conviction by prohibiting the use of
psychological tests unless it can be shown that the tests are valid
and not biased against any employee or group (i.e., without
measurement bias). Specifically the Employment Equity Act
(Republic of South Africa, 1998, p.14) prohibits unfair
discrimination by stating that:
No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly,
against an employee, in any employment policy or practice,
on one or more grounds, including gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin,
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status,
conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and
birth.
At the same time, however, paragraph 2(b) of the Employment
Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998, p. 14) could be
interpreted to mean that it does not constitute unfair
discrimination to use selection instruments that demonstrate
predictive validity to distinguish between, exclude or show
preference for any applicant:
It is not unfair discrimination to-
a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose
of this Act, or
b) distinguish, exclude, or prefer any person on the basis of an
inherent requirement of a job.
Under a construct orientated approach to personnel selection
(Binning & Barrett, 1989) selection instruments demonstrate
predictive validity if inferences about reliable and valid
measures of job performance can permissibly be made from
valid and reliable measures of person attributes that determine
the level of job success that will be achieved (Guion, 1998;
Messick, 1989). In this sense those attributes that correlate with
job performance could be regarded as inherent requirements of
the job. In paragraph 8 of the Employment Equity Act
(Republic of South Africa, 1998, p. 16) this position is
reiterated and qualified by requiring that all selection
instruments should be valid2 while at the same time their
measures should not be biased against members of any of the
previously cited protected groups:
Psychological testing and other similar assessments of an
employee are prohibited unless the test or assessment being
used-
a) has been scientifically shown to be valid and reliable; 
b) can be applied fairly to all employees;
c) is not biased against any employee or group.
Presumably the prohibition of biased psychological tests is seen
to serve the objective of the Act of “promoting equal
opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the
elimination of unfair discrimination” (Republic of South Africa,
1998, p. 12). When referring to tests or assessments that are not
biased against any employee or group, moreover, the Act is
referring to measurement bias. Although not necessarily all
studies have been precipitated by the Act, the argument that the
elimination of measurement bias would necessarily prevent
unfair discrimination nonetheless seems to have inspired a
number of bias studies in South Africa (Abrahams & Mauer,
1999; Schaap, 2001; Schaap, 2003; Schaap & Basson, 2003; van
Zyl & Visser, 1998). This line of reasoning also quite often seems
to form the essence of the argument in terms of which the
necessity of measurement bias analysis in South Africa is
motivated (Kanjee, 2001). In terms of this psychometric test view
it would, moreover, not be inappropriate if test publishers and
distributors would certify instruments as EEA compliant. In fact
it would probably be welcomed as a very useful guide in the
choice of selection instruments (Lopes, Roodt & Mauer, 2001).
The seal of approval is after all meant to communicate the
assurance that use of the test in question would serve the
objective of the Act of “promoting equal opportunity and fair
treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair
discrimination” (Republic of South Africa, 1998, p. 12). As a case
in point a HSRC test catalogue (2003) has recently awarded the
LPCAT with an EEA compliant seal of approval, presumably
because of the commendable rigor with which item bias analysis
has been performed using latent trait theory (De Beer, 2000). 
There finally exists the belief that the origin of adverse impact
resides in the selection instruments used for personnel selection
or in the differences in the latent trait being assessed. As an
expression of the former belief Sackett and Ellingson (1997, p.
707) for example, report (italics added):
An ongoing concern in the field of personnel selection is the
search for selection systems with high validity and low
adverse impact (i.e., similar selection ratios for majority and
minority groups). A longstanding source of tension in this
area results from certain types of predictors emerging as
valid indicators of performance, but also exhibiting
substantial group differences. For example, extensive research
has demonstrated a strong relationship between general
cognitive ability and job performance for multiple jobs
(Hunter, 1986; Re & Earles, 1991). However, cognitive tests
traditionally demonstrate adverse impact against racial
minorities (Hartigan & Widor, 1989; Jensen, 1980).
Maxwell and Arvey (1993) also seem to subscribe to this point of
view when they define the standardised difference in mean
predictor performance between protected and non-protected
groups ((XNP – XP)/X) as an index of adverse impact. Moreover
the belief exists that selection instruments differ in terms of the
adverse impact that they impose on protected groups and thus
can be graded in terms of their relative degree of adverse impact.
The extremely influential and highly respected Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures published by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) endorses
this position by requiring that:
Where two or more selection procedures are available which
serve the user’s legitimate interest in efficient and
trustworthy workmanship, and which are substantially
equally valid for a given purpose, the user should use the
procedure which has been demonstrated to have the lesser
adverse impact (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 1978, p. 38297).
The conviction that adverse impact is fundamentally
determined by differences in mean predictor performance
resulted in the investigation of various strategies to reduce
these subgroup differences in mean predictor scores in an
effort to increase the representation of members of protected
groups without sacrificing predictive accuracy (Sackett,
Schmitt, Ellingson & Kabin, 2001). These include the use of
valid, non-cognitive predictors (Sackett & Ellington, 1997;
Sackett et al., 2001; Schmitt, Rogers, Chan, Sheppard &
Jennings, 1997), identification and removal of culturally biased
items in the predictor (Humphreys, 1986; Sackett et al., 2001),
the use of alternative modes of presenting predictor stimuli
(Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Pulakos & Schmitt, 1996; Sackett et al.,
2001) and the use of coaching or orientation programmes
(Sackett et al., 2001).
The question is whether the broad psychometric stance outlined
above, in which the predictor, or some combination of
predictors, is the primary villain responsible for most if not all
of the evils associated with personnel selection from a diverse
applicant pool, is a psychometrically justified one that best
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serves the interests of all stakeholders involved? More to the
point, will it assist in achieving the extremely laudable vision
formulated by then president Mandela in the preamble to the
Employment Equity Bill (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 5)?
What we are against is not the upholding of standards as such
but the sustaining of barriers to the attainment of standards;
the special measures that we envisage to overcome the legacy
of past discrimination are not intended to ensure the
advancement of unqualified persons, but to see to it that
those who have been denied access to qualifications in the
past can become qualified now, and that those who have been
qualified all along but overlooked because of past discrimination,
are at last given their due.
The objective of this article is to critically reflect on the
psychometric tenability of the viewpoint outlined above. More
specifically, the intention is to identify specific flaws in the
foregoing argument and to outline the implication of these flaws
for the two-pronged employment equity objective of the
Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998)
reflected in the preamble to the Employment Equity Bill quoted
earlier. It is hoped that the argument presented here will elicit an
open and frank debate amongst South African human resource
management professionals. To paraphrase Guion (1998, p. 470),
fair selection, measurement bias and adverse impact are topics
too important to ignore or bury under popular rhetoric.
THE FUNDAMENTAL LOGIC UNDERLYING
PERSONNEL SELECTION
Assuming that only a limited number of vacancies exist, the
task of the selection decision maker is in essence to identify a
subgroup from the total group of applicants to allocate to the
accept treatment (Cronbach & Gleser, 1965), based on limited
but relevant information about the applicants. The subgroup,
furthermore, has to be chosen so as to maximise the average
gain on the utility scale on which the outcomes of decisions
are evaluated. The utility scale/payoff and the actual
outcomes or ultimate criterion (Austin & Villanova, 1992) are
the focus of interest in selection decisions (Bartram, Baron &
Kurz, 2003; Ghiselli, Campbell & Zedeck, 1981). In personnel
selection decisions, future job performance forms the basis
(i.e., the criterion) on which applicants should be evaluated so
as to determine their assignment to an appropriate treatment
(Cronbach & Gleser, 1965). Information on actual job
performance can, however, never be available at the time of
the selection decision. Under these circumstances, and in the
absence of any (relevant) information on the applicants, no
possibility exists to enhance the quality of the decision
making over that that could have been obtained by chance.
This seemingly innocent, but too often ignored, dilemma
points to a key fact that needs to be continually kept in mind
when contemplating the psychometric merits of the predictor
centred selection model outlined earlier. The crucial point
that needs to be appreciated is that the only alternative to
random decision making (other than not to take any decision
at all), would be to predict expected criterion performance (or
expected utility) actuarially (or clinically) from relevant,
though limited, information available at the time of the
selection decision and to base the selection decision on these
criterion-referenced inferences3. This implies that in
personnel selection the primary focus is on the criterion rather
than on the predictor from which inferences about the
criterion are made (Schmitt, 1989). This position is formally
acknowledged by the APA sanctioned interpretation of validity
and especially predictive validity (Ellis & Blustein, 1991;
Landy, 1986; Messick, 1989; Society for Industrial and
Organizational Psychology, 2003). The position, moreover,
underlies the generally accepted regression-based
interpretations of selection fairness (Cleary, 1968; Einhorn &
Bass, 1971; Huysamen, 2002). Very little if anything of this
realisation is, however, evident in the views on psychometric
testing and the law put forward by Bonthuys (2002) in a
somewhat cynically titled paper3. Even though it is logically
impossible to directly measure the performance construct at
the time of the selection decision, it can nonetheless be
predicted at the time of the selection decision if: (a) variance
in the performance construct can be explained in terms of one
or more predictors (b) the nature of the relationship between
these predictors and the performance construct has been made
explicit; and (c) predictor information can be obtained prior
to the selection decision in a psychometrically acceptable
format. The only information available at the time of the
(fixed treatment) selection decision (Cronbach & Gleser, 1965)
that could serve as such a substitute would be psychological,
physical, demographic or behavioural information on the
applicants. Such substitute information would be considered
relevant to the extent that the regression of the (composite)
criterion on a weighted (probably, but not necessarily, linear)
combination of information explains variance in the criterion.
Thus the existence of a relationship, preferably one that could
be articulated in statistical terms, between the outcomes
considered relevant by the decision maker and the
information actually used by the decision maker, constitutes a
fundamental and necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for
effective and equitable selection decisions.
Measurement data, once obtained, is translated into decisions
in accordance to some strategy for decision-making (Cronbach
& Gleser, 1965). A decision strategy describes how scores from
tests are to be combined with non-test information, and what
decision will be made for any given combination of facts. A
strategy is thus a rule for arriving at selection decisions used by
a decision maker in any possible contingency (Cronbach &
Gleser, 1965). It consists of a set of specified conditional
probabilities (typically either zero or unity), which reflects the
policy of the decision-maker. In the final analysis it is the
selection decision strategy that should be evaluated in terms of
its predictive validity - in other words in terms of the
correspondence that exists between the criterion-referenced
inferences made via the decision rule from the available
predictor information and the actual criterion performance
achieved. Demonstrating that the available predictor variables
individually correlate significantly with the criterion thus
constitutes insufficient evidence to justify a selection
procedure. Even demonstrating that the available predictor
variables in combination correlate significantly with the
criterion would constitute insufficient evidence to justify a
selection procedure if the manner in which the predictors are
combined would differ between application and validation.
This important realisation often seems to be absent in
validation studies, which combine selection information in
accordance with a clinical or judgemental strategy (Gatewood
& Feild, 1994).
Several selection decision-making strategies exist that range
from purely clinical to purely mechanical combinations of
data available to the decision maker (Grove & Meehl, 1996;
Kleinmutz, 1990; Gatewood & Feild, 1994; Murphy &
Davidshofer, 1988). All of these require that the nature of the
relationship between the criterion and the substitute
information be understood. The two extreme options,
however, differ in the way they express their understanding of
the criterion-information relationship. Clinical prediction
involves combining information from test scores and measures
obtained from interviews and observations covertly in terms of
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an implicit combination rule imbedded in the mind of a
clinician to arrive at a judgment about the expected criterion
performance of the individual being assessed (Grove & Meehl,
1996; Gatewood & Feild, 1994; Murphy & Davidshofer, 1988).
Mechanical prediction involves using the information overtly
in terms of an explicit combination rule to arrive at a judgment
about the expected criterion performance of the individual
being assessed (Gatewood & Feild, 1994; Murphy &
Davidshofer, 1988). An actuarial system of prediction
represents a mechanical method of combining information,
derived via statistical or mathematical analysis from actual
criterion and predictor data sets, to arrive at an overall
inference about the expected criterion performance of an
individual (Meehl, 1957; Murphy & Davidshofer, 1988). An
actuarially derived decision rule should, therefore, more
accurately reflect the nature of the relationship that exists
between the various latent predictor variables and the criterion
construct than a clinically derived selection decision rule. The
former would, in all likelihood, also be more consistently
applied than the latter.
The accuracy of clinical and actuarial prediction has been
studied widely (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Dawes, 1971;
Goldberg, 1970; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Kleinmutz, 1990; Meehl,
1954; 1957; Murphy & Davidshofer, 1988). These reviews seem
to suggest that clinicians very rarely make better predictions
that can be made using actuarially derived prediction methods,
that statistical methods are in many cases more accurate in
predicting relevant criteria than are highly trained clinicians,
and that clinical judgement should be replaced, wherever
possible, by mechanical methods of integrating the
information used in forming predictions (Murphy &
Davidshofer, 1988). Grove and Meehl, (1996) for example quite
categorically argue in favour of the mechanical combination of
selection data.
The decision whether to accept an applicant is based on the
mechanically or judgementally derived expected outcome
conditional on information on the applicant or, if a minimally
acceptable outcome state can be defined, the conditional
probability of success (or failure) given information on the
applicant. Alternatively, the bivariate distribution could be
converted into a contingency table through the formation of
intervals on both the predictor and the criterion. The resultant
validity matrix (Cronbach & Gleser, 1965) or expectancy table
(Ghiselli, Campbell & Zedeck, 1981; Lawsche & Balma, 1966),
indicating the probability of a specific criterion state
conditional on a specific information category, could then 
be used as basis for decision-making. Given the objective 
of human resource management in general and personnel
selection in particular to add value, a strict top-down 
selection decision-rule is furthermore assumed, based on
expected criterion performance or the conditional probability
of success. 
IN SEARCH OF SELECTION FAIRNESS
The question is firstly whether the selection decision strategy
under investigation is worth implementing in comparison to
an alternative (possibly currently existing) strategy. Utility
analysis (Boudreau, 1989; 1991; Brogden, 1949a; Cascio, 1991b;
Cronbach & Gleser, 1965; Naylor & Shine, 1965; Taylor &
Russell, 1939) aims to provide an answer to this question in
terms of various indices for judging worth. The question is
moreover whether the decision strategy that will dictate the
categories to which applicants will be assigned (accept or
reject) for any given combination of facts, can be considered
fair. Stated differently, the question is whether the decision
strategy will directly or indirectly put members of specific
applicant groups at an unfair, unjustifiable disadvantage.
Selection measures are designed to discriminate and in order
to accomplish their professed objective they must do so
(Cascio, 1991a). However, due to the relative visibility of the
selection mechanism's regulatory effect on the access to
employment opportunities, the question readily arises
whether the selection strategy discriminates fairly. Selection
fairness, however, represents an exceedingly elusive concept
to pin down with a definitive constitutive definition. The
Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (Standards)
acknowledges this dilemma (AERA, APA & NCME, 1999). The
problem is firstly that the concept cannot be adequately
defined purely in terms of psychometric considerations
without any attention to moral/ethical considerations. The
inescapable fact is that, due to differences in values, one
man's foul is another man's fair (Huysamen, 1995). The
problem is further complicated by the fact that a number of
different definitions and models of fairness exist which differ
in terms of their implicit ethical positions and which, under
certain conditions, are contradictory in terms of their
assessment of the fairness of a selection strategy and their
recommendations on remedial action (Petersen & Novick,
1976; Cascio, 1991a; Arvey & Faley, 1988). Three distinct
fundamental ethical positions (Hunter & Schmidt, 1976)
underpinning views on what constitutes fair selection have
been identified. A fairness model, based on any one of these
ethical positions (or a variant thereof), formalises the
interpretation of the fairness concept and thus permits the
deduction of a formal investigative procedure to assess the
fairness of a particular selection strategy should such a
strategy be challenged in terms of a prima facie showing of
adverse impact (Arvey & Faley, 1988; Singer, 1993).
A definite stance on what constitutes fair or unfair
discrimination in personnel selection nonetheless needs to be
taken. Since the Employment Equity Act (Republic of South
Africa, 1998) and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000)
both explicitly prohibit unfair discrimination, a definite
verdict on the fairness of the criterion inferences made during
selection needs to be pronounced. If the equity objective of
the Act is to be reached, we must commit to a specific
interpretation of selection fairness and stop hiding behind the
protest that it is impossible to produce definitive constitutive
and operational definitions of selection fairness. The
question, however, is, which of the variety of fairness models
that have been proposed (Arvey & Faley, 1988; Cascio, 1991a;
Huysamen, 1995; Petersen & Novick, 1976) would serve the
spirit of the Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa,
1998) best.
Influential technical guidelines on personnel selection
procedures (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
1978; Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology,
2003; Society for Industrial Psychology, 1998) seem to favour
unqualified individualism as the basic ethical point of
departure. The basic premise is that applicants with an 
equal probability of succeeding on the job (being applied 
for and at the time of the selection decision) should have 
an equal probability of obtaining the job, irrespective of
group membership (AERA, APA & NCME, 1999; Guion, 
1966; 1991; Huysamen, 2002). This fundamental premise,
moreover, seems to be in agreement with the anti-
discrimination objectives of the Employment Equity Act
(Republic of South Africa, 1998) as voiced by the previously
quoted preamble to the Employment Equity Bill (Republic 
of South Africa, 1996). To that should probably be added 
the principle voiced by the Principles for the Validation 
and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures (AERA, APA &
NCME, 1999; Society for Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, 2003) that all applicants should receive a 
uniform treatment in terms of testing conditions, access 
to training material, feedback and retest opportunities. This
latter interpretation seems to correspond with the stance 
of the Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 
1998, p. 16) that:
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Psychological testing and other similar assessments of an
employee are prohibited unless the test or assessment being
used-
b) can be applied fairly to all employees
More specifically technical guidelines on personnel selection
procedures (AERA, APA & NCME, 1999; Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 1978; Society for Industrial and
Organizational Psychology, 2003; Society for Industrial
Psychology, 1998) seem to favour the regression-based models of
selection fairness (Cleary, 1968; Einhorn & Bass, 1971;
Huysamen, 1996; Huysamen, 2002). Organised labour and other
affirmative action proponents could, however, possibly favour
the psychometrically less sound quota models (Huysamen, 1996;
Petersen & Novick, 1976; Schmitt, 1989). It would, however,
probably be wise not to underestimate the business and intuitive
psychometric acumen of organised labour representatives. The
regression or Cleary model of selection fairness defines fairness
in terms of the absence of differences in regression slopes and/or
intercepts across the subgroups comprising the applicant
population (Arvey & Faley, 1988; Petersen & Novick, 1976;
Cascio, 1991a; Maxwell & Arvey, 1993). According to Cleary
(Cleary, 1968, p. 115):
A test is biased for members of a subgroup of the population
if, in the prediction of the criterion for which the test was
designed, consistent nonzero errors of prediction are made
for members of the subgroup. In other words, the test is
biased if the criterion score predicted from the common
regression line is consistently too high or too low for
members of the subgroup. With this definition of bias, there
may be a connotation of unfair, particularly if the use of the
test produces a prediction that is too low. If the test is used
for selection, members of a subgroup may be rejected when
they were capable of adequate performance.
The Cleary model thus argues that selection decision-making,
based on expected criterion performance, can be considered unfair
or discriminatory if the position members of specific groups
receive in the rank-order resulting from the decision strategy is
either systematically too low or systematically too high for
members of a particular group. This would happen if group
membership explains variance in the (unbiased) criterion, either
as a main effect or in interaction with the predictors, which is
not explained by the predictors, and the selection strategy fails to
take group membership into account. Under these conditions the
criterion inferences derived from selection instrument scores,
could be said to exhibit predictive bias (Guion, 1991; 1998).
The Cleary model therefore examines the fairness of a selection
strategy by fitting a saturated regression equation, shown as
equation 1 below, and testing the hypothesis H01: 2 = 3 = 0
against the alternative hypothesis Ha: at least one of the 
two parameters is not zero (Bartlett, Bobko, Mosier & Hannan,
1978; Berenson, Levine & Goldstein, 1983; Kleinbaum & 
Kupper, 1978).
E(Y) =  + 1X + 2D + 3XD (1)
In equation 1, X is a single predictor or a (clinically or
actuarially) weighted combination of predictors, and D is a
dummy variable representing group membership such that 
D = 0 would indicate membership of a protected group and 
D = 1 membership of a non-protected group (or vice versa).
Should H01 not be rejected it would imply that selection
decisions based on expected criterion performance derived
from the combined regression equation is fair. Should H01,
however, be rejected it would imply that selection decision-
making based on expected criterion performance derived from
the combined regression equation is unfair because the rank-
order resulting from the decision strategy is either
systematically too low or systematically too high. The
inappropriate placement in the selection rank order will result
from the use of the combined regression equation because the
rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that the separate
regression equations differ in terms of slope and/or intercept
(i.e. one would have to conclude that the regression models
fitted to the two subgroups do not coincide). Although it is
almost instinctive to suspect that predictive bias would
systematically and unfairly burden applicants from the
previously disadvantaged community this has not generally
been the case in the United States (Arvey & Faley, 1988;
Huysamen, 1996; Huysamen, 2002). Insufficient local research
on predictive bias, however, prevents the formulation of a
general position on nature and consequences of predictive bias
in South Africa. Nonetheless, to a certain extent the subsequent
argument (quite possibly erroneously) assumes that when
group membership explains variance in the criterion that is not
explained by the predictors, and the selection strategy fails to
take group membership into account, applicants from the
previously disadvantaged community will be unfairly
burdened. The essence of the argument would, however, not be
affected if the opposite would be true. 
The Einhorn-Bass selection fairness model argues that selection
decision-making, based on the conditional probability of success,
can be considered unfair or discriminatory if the position
members of specific groups receive in the rank-order resulting
from the decision strategy is either systematically too low or
systematically too high. The equal risk or Einhorn-Bass
selection fairness model thus operationalises the concept of
fairness in terms of differences in the probability of success
conditional on predictor performance. In terms of the equal
risk model a selection strategy would be considered unfair if
the probability of a member of the protected group (D = 0)
with a given predictor score (X = xc) displaying a criterion
performance equal to or higher than Yc is different from a
member of the non-protected group (D = 1) who received the
same predictor score (i.e., P [Y Yc| X = xc; D = 0]  P [Y Yc|X
= xc; D = 1]) and the selection strategy fails to take this into
account (Petersen & Novick, 1976; Cascio, 1991a; Einhorn &
Bass, 1971). The Einhorn-Bass conceptualisation thus
corresponds exactly to the Guion (1966, p. 26) definition of
unfair discrimination referred to earlier: The equal risk model
would therefore judge any selection strategy unfair should it be
considered unfair by the Cleary model. In addition, however, it
would also consider the selection strategy unfair if the
criterion variance conditional on predictor performance differs
across the two applicant subgroups (i.e. ²y|x; D0 ²y|x; D1)
(Petersen & Novick, 1976; Cascio, 1991a; Einhorn & Bass, 1971).
The critical null hypothesis to be tested in terms of the
Einhorn-Bass selection fairness model is therefore H02: ²y|x;
D0 = ²y|x; D1. 
The first critical point to appreciate is that H01 and/or H02 can be
rejected even though the regression of the criterion on the
predictor is significant (i.e., the selection instrument
demonstrates predictive validity). The Employment Equity Act
(Republic of South Africa, 1998) is correct in describing the use
of invalid predictors as an unacceptable practice since it violates
the fundamental principle of the unqualified individualism
position that applicants with an equal probability of succeeding
on the job should have an equal probability of obtaining the job,
irrespective of group membership (Guion, 1991). Since the use
of a completely invalid predictor is tantamount to random
selection, it gives all applicants the same probability of
obtaining the job despite the fact that they differ in terms of the
probability of succeeding on the job. The use of a predictor that
demonstrates predictive validity, however, is not a sufficient
condition to ensure that the fundamental principle comprising
unqualified individualism is complied with. Even when a
predictor demonstrates predictive validity, (indirect)
discrimination can still unfairly disadvantage members of
specific subgroups if group membership significantly explains
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variance in the criterion, which is not explained by the predictor,
and if the selection strategy fails to take this fact into account.
The position of the Employment Equity Act (Republic of South
Africa, 1998, p. 14) that:
it is not unfair discrimination to …. distinguish, exclude, or
prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of
a job, 
therefore seems questionably lenient. Translated into
psychometric terms, the Employment Equity Act (Republic of
South Africa, 1998, p. 14) seems to hold the questionable
position that it is not unfair discrimination to distinguish
between, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of the scores
obtained on a valid selection instrument. The very essence of
selection is to distinguish between, exclude or show preference
for individuals on the basis of measures that are systematically
related to the criterion [i.e., valid selection instruments]. The
question nonetheless remains whether the criterion-referenced
inferences derived from the relevant predictor information does
not unfairly burden or disadvantage members of specific
subgroups? The definition of discrimination6 provided by the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000) read in conjunction with
the Cleary (Cleary, 1968) interpretation of unfair discrimination
attests to the questionable nature of the Employment Equity Act
position:
1. “discrimination” means any act or omission, including a
policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which
directly or indirectly-
a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or
b) withholds any benefits, opportunities or advantages from,
any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds
If group membership does significantly explain variance in the
criterion, which is not explained by the predictor, and if the
selection strategy fails to take this fact into account, significant
systematic group-related prediction errors will occur and the
selection decision-rule will therefore discriminate since it will
disadvantage members of a specific group by placing them
inappropriate low in the selection rank order even though the
predictor significantly correlates with the criterion. Moreover
it could be argued that the current formulation of the
Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) still
leaves a critical loophole, which will undermine the realisation
of the vision of former President Mandela (Republic of South
Africa, 1996, p. 5):
…. that those who have been qualified all along but
overlooked because of past discrimination, are at last given
their due..
The appropriate remedy, should H0 be rejected, is contingent
on the explanation for the rejection of the null hypothesis.
The Cleary model's prescription for a diagnosed unfair
selection strategy thus depends on whether there exists an
equivalent incremental difference in criterion performance
across applicants from the two subgroups, regardless of
predictor performance (i.e. the interaction parameter b3 can
be assumed zero but the group main effect parameter b2 is
assumed non-zero) or a non-equivalent incremental difference
in criterion performance across applicants from the two
subgroups, dependent on the ability level of the applicants
(i.e. there exists a subgroup x predictor performance
interaction effect on criterion performance) (Bartlett et al.,
1978; Berenson, Levine & Goldstein, 1983; Kleinbaum &
Kupper, 1978). The Cleary solution to the fairness problem
thus dictates that the information category entries in the
strategy matrix (Cronbach & Gleser, 1965) should be derived
from an appropriately expanded multiple regression equation
containing the group variable either as a main effect and/or as
an interaction effect (Bartlett et al., 1978; Schmitt, 1989). This
recommendation, however, is contingent on the expanded
regression equation successfully cross-validating on a holdout
sample (Bartlett et al., 1978). The need to expand the
regression equation through the addition of the group
variable either as a main effect and/or as an interaction effect
should therefore be maintained in independent samples taken
from the applicant population. 
The Einhorn-Bass solution to the fairness problem would be to
derive the information category entries (i.e. P[Y Yc|Xi; Dj]) in
the strategy matrix (Cronbach & Gleser, 1965) from the
appropriate regression equation. The appropriate conditional
probabilities are obtained by deriving E[Y|Xi; Dj] from the
appropriate regression equation and subsequently, transforming
Yc to a standard score in the conditional criterion distribution
(assuming normality) by using the appropriate standard error of
estimate as denominator (Berenson, Levine & Goldstein, 1983;
Kleinbaum & Kupper, 1978; Einhorn & Bass, 1971).
In both cases the systematic, group-related over- and under-
prediction of the criterion would thereby be removed. The
inappropriate positioning of members of protected and non-
protected groups in the selection rank order would consequently
be corrected. Moreover, due to the closer correspondence of
estimated and actual criterion performance, the predictive
validity of criterion inferences would thereby also be enhanced.
Finally, since selection utility is a positive linear function of
validity (Brogden, 1946; 1949a; 1949b; Cochran, 1951), it would
pay to eliminate unfair discrimination in the manner dictated by
the regression-based models of selection fairness.
The second important point that should be stressed is therefore
that all valid predictors can in principle be used fairly in the
regression-based sense of the term. The converse is, however,
not true even though the Employment Equity Act seems to
endorse it. Using a valid predictor is not sufficient to conclude
that selection will be fair. Fair or unfair discrimination,
therefore, does not reside in the predictor as such. Fair or
unfair discrimination, therefore, also does not reside in
differences in mean predictor score (Schmitt, 1989). Cleary
(1968, p. 115) somehow seemed to have done us a disservice by
referring to test bias in her interpretation of selection fairness
in as far as the term tends to suggest that unfair discrimination
is caused by the test. Logically it therefore is not possible to
ensure selection fairness solely through the judicious choice of
selection instruments. Stated more strongly - it is a totally
futile exercise to try and identify or develop selection
instruments that will immunise the human resource
practitioner against discriminatory personnel selection
practices, irrespective of how great the yearning for such a
simple solution might be. In addition, the practice of
endorsing specific instruments as Employment Equity Act
compliant and thereby reinforcing and perpetuating the belief
that it is possible to achieve legal immunity through the
judicious choice of selection tools might be well intentioned,
but should nonetheless be rejected as a misleading and
groundless marketing strategy. 
This raises a third important point. By far the majority of
selection decisions in South Africa are probably based on
clinically (as opposed to actuarially) derived criterion
inferences. The validity and fairness of such clinically derived
inferences can quite easily be established utilising conventional
validation techniques, provided an appropriate criterion
measure and a sufficiently large N are available. However, the
ability of a clinical selection strategy to adapt itself in a manner
that would eliminate systematic prediction errors, should they
be identified, seems doubtful. Given that selection decisions are
based on (clinically or mechanically derived) estimates of
criterion performance, a critical requirement for effective
selection is that the nature of the predictor-criterion relationship
should be accurately understood. The literature (Dawes &
Corrigan, 1974; Goldberg, 1970; Grove & Meehl, 1996;
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6 Discrimination, in terms of this definition, should not be equated with unfair discrimination but rather with adverse impact.
Kleinmutz, 1990; Meehl, 1954; 1957; 1956; Dawes, 1971; Murphy
& Davidshofer, 1988; Wiggins, 1973) rather unequivocally
considers the mechanical methods of integrating the
information used in forming predictions as superior to clinical
methods (at least with regards to relative short-term
predictions). Actuarially derived mechanical decision rules
probably derive their superior performance record through their
ability to capture the nature of the relationship that exists
between the various latent predictor variables and the criterion
construct with greater accuracy and the greater consistency with
which the rule is applied (Gatewood & Feild, 1994). The problem
thus seems that in some cases an already complex job
performance structural model that needs to be understood is
made even more complex by the fact that a group membership
variable not only affects the latent variables that determine job
performance, but also affects job performance directly and
possibly moderates the effect of one or more latent variables on
performance. The likelihood that the clinical mind will be able
to accurately understand the manner in which even a small
subset of these latent variables combine to determine criterion
performance and be able to consistently apply this
understanding, therefore seems even smaller than in cases where
group membership need not be considered to accurately
estimate job performance.
In too many cases where it is feasible to conduct the rigorous
validation research required to develop proper actuarial decision
rules, it has sadly enough not been performed. In many cases
where selection decisions are currently being made, moreover, it
will (seemingly) not be feasible to do so. Unless ingenious ways
can be found to circumvent the practical obstacles at present
preventing these studies (e.g. synthetic validation, inter-
organisational cooperation, bootstrapping), the harsh reality
will be that in many cases selection fairness will remain an
unattainable ideal. Simply because a need for equitable selection
exists does not mean that it will necessarily be easily attainable
in each and every case; it might even be unattainable in some
cases irrespective of how strong the desire for a fair selection
procedure might be.
In the United States of America the remedies for unfair selection
proposed by Cleary (Cleary, 1968), and Einhorn and Bass (1971),
outlined above, would seemingly not be allowed (Huysamen,
2002). The problem is that section 106 (1) of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act (in Guion, 1998, p. 468) prohibits the adjustment of
test scores on the basis of group membership:
It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer, in
connection with the selection or referral of applicants or
candidates for employment or promotion to adjust the scores
of, use different cutoffs for, or otherwise alter the results of
employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.
In its (quite justified) effort to prohibit within-group (construct-
referenced) norming the Civil Rights Act (1991) seemingly
worded the relevant section in such broad terms that it could be
interpreted to mean that it also is illegal to attach different
criterion-referenced interpretations to the same test score as a
function of group membership. The effect of this seems to be
that selection unfairness can be evaluated, but once detected
cannot be rectified in terms of the logic of the model that was
used to detect it. Psychometrically this seems like an internal
contradiction. If legislative thinking and psychometric
rationality disagrees, should the latter challenge the former or
should the legislative constraints simply be passively accepted as
part of the rules that govern the manner in which the
employment game is played? The argument presented in this
paper seems to suggest that some unfortunate discrepancies
between legislative thinking, specifically as expressed by the
Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998), and
psychometric theory also exist in South Africa. Moreover, too
few South African psychometric scholars seem to be concerned
about this. Questionably worded sections of the Act simply seem
to have been passively accepted as part of the new rules that now
govern the manner in which the employment game is to be
played in the democratic South Africa.
Despite other possible flaws, the Employment Equity Act
(Republic of South Africa, 1998) and the Promotion of Equality
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Republic of South
Africa, 2000), however, fortunately seemingly still would permit
human resource management professionals to follow the
regression-based fairness models to their logical conclusion by
attaching different criterion-referenced interpretations to the
same test score if the validation data would require it. This
position is, however, not generally held nor is it widely practiced
in South Africa. It is moreover, ironically, that the practice of
attaching different criterion-referenced interpretations to the
same test score will most likely be opposed by many in South
Africa as an unfair selection practice.
IN SEARCH OF SELECTION FAIRNESS; THE ROLE
OF MEASUREMENT BIAS
Surely selection fairness cannot be achieved if the predictor is
not free from measurement bias? The use of selection
instruments that are biased against members of protected
groups in the measurement of the underlying latent variable
must surely unavoidably result in unfair discrimination against
the members of those groups? Is this not the reasoning behind
the Employment Equity Act’s (Republic of South Africa, 
1998) insistence that biased psychological tests may not be
used to distinguish between, exclude or show preference 
for any applicant? 
Bias unfortunately is an emotionally charged term (Humphreys,
1986) that has a negative connotation to it. It probably would
not be incorrect to refer to measurement bias as a characteristic
of an assessment instrument. It would, however, be more
informative to interpret measurement bias (similarly to
predictive bias) as a systematic, group-related error in the
inferences made from obtained measures. In the case of
measurement bias, however, the systematic, group-related error
is not in the inferences made with regards to a criterion (or
performance) construct (h) but rather with regards to the
standing on the latent trait  (or person construct 	) being
assessed by the selection instrument in question (Millsap &
Everson, 1993). With regards to measurement bias (as opposed to
predictive bias), a distinction needs to be made between scale
bias, item bias and factorial bias (Drasgow & Hulin, 1990;
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). 
Assume a continuous predictor scale X measuring a latent trait 
 (or 	) applied to members of two groups 
1 (D = 0) and 
2, 
(D = 1). Scale bias (or differential scale functioning) can be said
to exist if P[X xc|= c; D = 0]  P[X xc|= c; D = 1]. Scale
bias exists when the probability of achieving a specific observed
score (X xc) differs for members of protected (D = 0) and non-
protected (D = 1) groups when controlling for the latent trait ()
being measured. Scale bias therefore exists when group
membership () explains variance in the observed scale score X,
either as a main effect or in interaction with the latent variable
 (or 	), X is meant to reflect, which is not explained by that
latent variable  (Drasgow & Hulin, 1990; Millsap & Everson,
1993). Scale bias, therefore exists if the regression of the
observed predictor score X on the latent variable  (or 	) differs
across groups in terms of intercept (i.e. the expected observed
score when  = 0) and/or slope. Item bias (or differential item
functioning) would be defined similarly. Assume a dichotomous
item X measuring a latent trait  (or 	) applied to members of
two groups 
1 (D = 0) and 
2, (D = 1). Item bias can be said to
exist if P[X = xc|= c; D = 0]  P[X = xc|= c; D = 1]. Item bias
therefore exists when group membership () explains variance
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in the observed item score X, either as a main effect or in
interaction with the latent variable  (or 	), X is meant to reflect,
which is not explained by that latent variable q (Millsap &
Everson, 1993). Item bias, therefore exists if the (non-linear)
regression of the observed item score X on the latent variable 
(or 	) differs across groups in terms of intercept (i.e. the
difficulty parameter b) and/or slope (i.e., the discrimination
parameter a)7 (Drasgow & Hulin, 1990; Drasgow & Parsons, 1983;
Guion, 1998; Humphreys, 1986). Items are combined to
determine an observed predictor scale score. The parameters of
the scale or test characteristic curve (TSS) are determined by the
parameters of item characteristic curves of the items comprising
the scale (Guion, 1998). Criterion inferences are derived from
the observed predictor scale scores and not individual item
scores. The question thus firstly is how differential item
functioning on the item level affects bias on the predictor scale
level and secondly, if bias should exist on the predictor scale
level, whether slope differences in the TCC would have a
different effect on the regression of the criterion on the
predictor than intercept (i.e., difficulty parameter) differences in
the TCC? With regard to the first question there is evidence to
suggest that in the United States, at least for cognitive tests,
approximately half of differentially functioning items in a scale
favour members of the non-protected group whereas the other
half is biased against members of the non-protected group
(Hunter & Schmidt, 2000; Society for Industrial and
Organizational Psychology, 2003). The net effect is no scale bias.
The situation locally is unknown.
If, however, scale bias would occur, it does not seem
unreasonable to argue that the effect of group-related slope
differences in the TCC should have a different effect on the
regression of the criterion on the predictor than group-related
intercept differences in the TCC8. Intercept differences in the
TCC would imply that group significantly explains unique
variance in the scale scores, not explained by the latent variable
as a main effect. The observed predictor scale scores thus vary
more (or less, depending on the nature of the latent means and
the direction of the bias) than could be expected based only on
the variance in the latent variable the scale is meant to reflect.
The predictor scale means would therefore differ more (or less)
than would have been the case if group had not explained
unique variance in X. The movement in the observed predictor
means should affect the intercept of the regression of the
criterion on the predictor. More specifically it should create
intercept differences, increase existing intercept differences or
reduce intercept differences. Humphreys (1986) seems to agree.
It moreover seems reasonable to argue that slope differences in
the TCC would imply that group significantly explains unique
variance in the scale scores, not explained by the latent variable
as a group x predictor interaction effect. This would imply that
the mean/expected observed scale score associated with a fixed
latent trait level, increases at a differential rate for members of
the protected and non-protected groups. This most probably
would also have the effect of increasing observed predictor
score variance. More importantly, however, since movement up
the latent variable axis is associated with a differential rate of
increase in X, differences in the scale discrimination parameter
should affect the slope of the regression of the criterion on the
predictor in addition to the intercept since it is the latent
variable that ultimately determines the level of criterion
performance achieved. Again Humphreys (1986) seems to have
the same opinion.
If not properly accounted for in the selection decision 
rule, both forms of predictor scale bias could therefore 
have the effect of disadvantaging members of a specific group
in that they would be positioned too low in the selection 
rank-order due to systematic group-related prediction errors.
The systematic, group-related over- and under prediction of 
the criterion can, however, be removed by including group in
the regression model as a main effect and/or a group x
predictor interaction effect (although the scale bias itself
would not thereby be removed). Again the assumption is that
the criterion measures are reliable, valid and unbiased
measures of the criterion construct. The inappropriate
positioning of members of protected and non-protected groups
in the selection rank order resulting from scale bias can
therefore be corrected. 
It, moreover, also seems reasonable to argue that the absence of
predictor scale bias is no guarantee that discrimination in
criterion-referenced selection cannot occur. Assuming a
continuous scale X measuring a latent trait  (or 	) applied to
members of two groups 
1 and 
2, a reliable and unbiased
criterion measure Y determined (in part) by , it could still
happen, even though P(X xc| = c; = 
1) = P(X xc|= c; 
 = 
2) (i.e., no scale bias), that P(Y  Yk|X = xc;  = 
1) 
P(Y Yk|X = xc;  = 
2). Even though the latent predictor variable
is measured without bias it should still in principle be possible
that (predictive) bias could exist in the criterion inferences
derived from the unbiased predictor measures. Predictive bias
exists if the regression of the criterion on the predictor differs
across protected and non-protected groups and this difference is
not taken into account when deriving criterion estimates. This
can easily happen even though no scale bias exists. This seems
important since it would suggest that even if the Employment
Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) would be successful
in eradicating all forms of measurement bias it would thereby
still not have succeeded in ensuring that selection decisions do
not disadvantage members of specific groups.
It is consequently not quite clear why the Employment Equity
Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998), in its effort to promote
“equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through
the elimination of unfair discrimination” (Republic of South
Africa, 1998, p. 12), would want to prohibit the use of scale
biased psychological tests and other similar assessments
(Republic of South Africa, 1998, p. 16). Ensuring that predictors
are (predictively) valid and ensuring that predictors are free
from item- and scale bias is neither necessary nor sufficient to
ensure that the objective of the elimination of unfair
discrimination will be reached. Neither will the presence of
predictor scale bias necessarily nor unavoidably result in unfair
criterion-referenced selection.
The argument presented earlier on the probability of eliminating
predictive bias in judgmental decision rules again seems highly
relevant here. When criterion inferences are derived clinically
from predictor scale scores containing measurement bias, unfair
discrimination most likely would occur. The unfair
discrimination should, however, ultimately not be blamed on
the scale bias existing in the predictor but rather on the
inappropriate manner in which criterion inferences are derived
from the predictor scale scores.
Factorial (or construct) bias refers to the extent to which the
factor structure (Byrne, 1998) or measurement model
(Diamantopoulos & Sigauw, 2000; Mels, 2003) is invariant across
groups. Factorial equivalence (Byrne, 1998) would be
demonstrated if the parameters constituting the measurement
model would remain the same across groups. More specifically
factorial equivalence (Byrne, 1998) would be demonstrated if (a)
the same number of latent dimension(s) are required to explain
the covariances observed amongst the items comprising the tests,
(b) the loadings of the items on their designated latent
dimensions (X) are invariant across groups, (c) the intercept of
the regression of the item scores on the latent variables (X) are
invariant across groups, (d) the correlations amongst the latent
dimensions are invariant across groups, and possibly, although
this might be considered an overly stringent requirement (Byrne,
1998), (e) the measurement error variances and covariances are
invariant across groups. In short, factorial equivalence would be
indicated if the factor loading matrix (X), factor correlation
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7 From a structural equation modelling perspective, uniform and non-uniform item bias could be said to exist if the vector of intercept parameters X and the factor-loading matrix X of slope
parameters differ across groups (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). 8 The ideal would be to beyond the speculative verbal arguments presented here and to eventually develop an analytical understanding
of the manner in which differences in the TCC parameters affect the regression of the criterion on the predictor.
matrix () and the variance-covariance matrix of measurement
error terms () and the vector of intercept terms of the
regression of the observed item scores on the underlying latent
variables (X) (Byrne, 1998; Diamantopoulos & Sigauw, 2000;
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) are invariant across groups.
The important but seemingly neglected question is what the
consequences of significant differences in these matrices,
individually and collectively, across groups are for the
regression of the criterion on the predictor? The previously
cited measurement equivalence studies in South Africa do not
seem to analyse the relationship between construct bias and
equity in any great depth but rather seem to simply accept that
lack of structural equivalence in any form one way or another
will result in discriminatory selection practices. It probably
would be safe to argue that if major differences exist in X
across groups, both in terms of number of factors and factor
loadings, that significant differences in predictive validity
would probably exist across groups and therefore most likely
also significant slope differences. This, however, seems an
unlikely event, since it appears to be generally accepted, in the
United States at least, that both single group validity and
differential validity occur no more than could be expected by
chance (Bartlett et al., 1978; Schmidt & Hunter, 1981; Schmitt,
1989). Nonetheless, the Employment Equity Act (Republic of
South Africa, 1998) probably would be correct in prohibiting
this extreme form of construct bias. The Employment Equity
Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998), however, is wrong in as far
as it implies that the absence of factorial bias will ensure that
discrimination in criterion-referenced selection cannot occur.
What the effect of minor, albeit significant differences in
factor loadings, phi coefficients or error variances on the
regression of the criterion on the predictor might be is not
clear. Could variance in the measurement model parameters
across groups, apart from the possibility mentioned above,
affect the regression of the criterion on the predictor in such a
manner that it would preclude the possibility of adapting the
prediction model in a way that would prevent group-related
prediction errors?
The foregoing is a plea to refrain from motivating research on
measurement bias in terms of the simplistic premise that it will
necessarily promote “equal opportunity and fair treatment in
employment through the elimination of unfair discrimi-
nation” (Republic of South Africa, 1998, p. 12). The foregoing
argument should not be construed as a plea that bias analysis
should not be performed. Although the most recent edition of
the Principles (Society for Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, 2003) seems rather indifferent towards differential
item functioning research in the personnel selection domain,
this type of research should nonetheless be regarded as
indispensable in the development of both predictor and
criterion measures. In the personnel selection domain,
hypotheses are developed on the nature of the latent person
variables that determine job performance (Guion, 1991; 1998;
Landy, 1986). In these hypothesised relationships lies the
possibility of estimating job performance. In pursuit of this
possibility instruments are subsequently developed (or chosen)
to measure these constructs as defined amongst all members of
the applicant population. Despite the fact that the
measurement of these latent traits is not an objective in and by
itself but rather one phase in a larger process, every effort
should nonetheless be made to see to it that these instruments
do provide reliable, valid and unbiased measures of their target
constructs because that is what they were commissioned to do
at that stage of the process. The fact that later stages in the
process could be adapted to accommodate some of the failures
in earlier stages should never be used as an excuse to condone
careless test construction9. Measurement bias therefore can and
should as far as possible be avoided through the judicious
choice of properly developed selection instruments. In doing
so, however, the danger of systematically disadvantaging
members of specific groups in personnel selection would not
necessarily have been neutralised.
Although easier said than done (Guion, 1998) measurement
bias analysis with regards to the criterion is critically
important if valid and credible validity, fairness and utility
analyses results are desired (Schmitt, 1989). If measurement
bias in the criterion against protected groups is not detected
and removed prior to the validity, fairness and utility analyses,
unfair discrimination will be invisible and irreversibly built
into the selection decision rule.
IN SEARCH OF MINIMUM ADVERSE IMPACT
Adverse impact in personnel selection occurs when a specific
selection strategy affords members of a specific group a lower
likelihood to be selected than members of another group.
Adverse impact is indicated when there is a substantial difference
in the selection ratios of groups that work to the disadvantage of
members belonging to a certain group (Guion, 1991; 1998). A
selection ratio for any group, which is less than four-fifths (4/5)
or 80 percent of the ratio of the group with the highest selection
ratio would typically be regarded as evidence of adverse impact
(Huysamen, 1996; Maxwell & Arvey, 1993). The four-fifth rule is
normally interpreted with reference to the predictor
distributions (Arvey & Faley, 1988; Guion, 1991; 1998; Hough,
Oswald & Ployhart., 2001; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997; Sackett &
Wilk, 1994) In the conceptualisation of adverse impact it is,
however, critically important to appreciate that the selection
ratios for the various groups should ultimately be determined by
their expected criterion performance conditional on their test
performance (derived fairly, i.e., without systematic prediction
bias) and not the selection ratios that would have resulted if
selection would have occurred top-down on the predictor. The
Maxwell and Arvey (1993) position that the standardised
difference on the predictor between protected and non-
protected groups should serve as an index of adverse impact
therefore is highly questionable10. The standardised difference
on the criterion (or expected criterion) between protected and
non-protected groups should rather serve as an index of adverse
impact. The criterion construct is the focus of interest in
selection decisions. Predictor measures should be interpreted in
terms of expected/predicted criterion performance in personnel
selection. Since selection decisions are based on rank ordered
expected criterion performance, the selection ratios in question
should therefore be calculated on the E[Y|Xi;Di] distribution.
The question thus is whether the selection ratio’s based on the
predicted criterion performance (E[Y|Xi; Di]), derived fairly via
moderated regression analysis from the predictor measures Xi,
differ for protected and non-protected groups.
Adverse impact in and by itself does not constitute
discrimination. In employment litigation in the United States
of America adverse impact is used to make a prima facie case for
discrimination11. Once established, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant (Arvey & Faley, 1988; Dupper, 2002; Guion,
1991). If adverse impact is shown, the burden of proof shifts to
the employer to demonstrate the job-relatedness of the
selection procedure and that the inferences derived from the
predictor scores are fair. Alternatively, the employer could
show that no equally valid alternative, with less adverse impact,
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9 Differential reliability across protected and non-protected groups could quite possibly be the most prevalent fatal test construction failure in South Africa because in its extreme form it would
render validity, item bias, scale bias, measurement and structural equivalence and predictive bias analyses highly questionable. The development of insightful diagnostic hypotheses, derived from
measurement theory, however, seems to be a critical prerequisite that needs to be satisfied if local test development initiatives would want to overcome the differential reliability problem quite often
found with imported psychometric tests. 10 It only makes sense to do so if selection decisions were inappropriately directly based on predictor scores instead of the expected criterion scores
conditional on the predictor scores. Although equity legislation in the United States prohibits differential score interpretation it does not prohibit criterion-referenced predictor interpretation as such.
11 Adverse impact defined in terms of the criterion is, however, not a necessary condition for unfair (criterion-referenced) personnel selection to exist. If, for example the mean criterion performance
of protected and unprotected groups would differ significantly but the predictor distributions would coincide, selection based on the predictor scores or based on the regression of the criterion on
the predictor would disadvantage the members of the group scoring higher on the criterion. This de facto discriminatory procedure, however, seemingly is immune against litigation since it does not
create adverse impact and therefore leaves no prima facie evidence of discrimination. Moreover, this illustrates the potential danger of trying to ameliorate adverse impact (Hough et al., 2001) by
focusing on strategies for reducing subgroup mean differences in the predictor.
exists. Even though the use of the latter line of defence is quite
widely advocated (Arvey & Faley, 1988; Cook, 1998; Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 1978; Gatewood &
Feild, 1994; Guion, 1991; Maxwell & Arvey, 1993), it
nonetheless seems highly questionable. The remedy proposed
by the Uniform Guidelines only makes sense if adverse impact
is defined in terms of the predictor distributions. This in turn
would make sense if selection decisions would be based on
inferences regarding predictor constructs derived from
predictor scores. Selection decisions should, however, not be
based on predictor construct inferences but should rather be
based on criterion estimates derived from the predictor. This is
clearly signalled by the APA sanctioned interpretation of
predictive validity as the permissibility of criterion inferences
derived from test scores (Society for Industrial and
Organizational Psychology, 2003). The regression-based
interpretations of selection fairness (Cleary, 1968; Einhorn &
Bass, 1971; Huysamen, 1996; Huysamen, 2002) favoured by the
Principles (Society for Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, 2003) and the South African Guidelines (Society
for Industrial Psychology, 1998) moreover also explicitly
reflects the assumption that selection decisions are based on
criterion estimates derived from the predictor. In the final
analysis the cause of adverse impact in personnel selection
therefore resides in systematic differences in criterion
distributions. To deny this would be to deny the logic
underlying predictive validity and the regression-based
interpretations of selection fairness. The ratio of the selection
ratio of the protected group to that of the non-protected group
(SR[P]/SR[NP]) will necessarily be less than unity in a strict
top-down selection strategy based on E[Y|Xi; Di], to the extent
that the mean criterion performance of the protected and non-
protected groups differ (YP < YNP). Adverse impact in criterion
referenced personnel selection can therefore not be avoided by
the judicious choice of selection instruments (Huysamen,
1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1981). Nor can selection instruments
be graded in terms of the degree of their adverse impact. Not
even an omniscient but “meritocratic” decision-maker would
be able to avoid (fair) adverse impact if the mean criterion
performance of the protected and non-protected groups differ
(i.e., if YP < YN). If adverse impact occurs because of
differences in predictor performance across groups but which
cannot be justified in terms of differences in criterion
performance, it would imply that the criterion inferences
derived from such test scores are biased (i.e., the selection
decision-making is unfair in the Cleary sense of the term). This
type of unfair/discriminatory adverse impact can be avoided,
however, by eliminating the systematic, grouprelated predic-
tion error. As Schmitt (1989, p. 138) appropriately remarks:
… the presence of subgroup mean differences on selection
tests is not terribly important if we adopt Cleary’s definition
of fair test use.
How this stance links up with his subsequent predictor-
focused search for strategies to reduce adverse impact (Sackett,
Schmitt, Ellingson & Kabin, 2001; Schmitt, Rogers, Chan,
Sheppard & Jennings, 1997) is not clear. The results reported
by Sackett and Ellingson (1997) on the protected group
selection ratio relative to the non-protected group selection
ratio for various standardised group differences in mean
predictor performance (d) should therefore still be relevant
provided that d is now interpreted with reference to the
distributions of expected criterion performance rather than
the predictor distributions. Their results on the four-fifths
ratios for specific non-protected group selection ratios and
values of d should therefore also still be relevant again
provided that d is interpreted with reference to the
distributions of expected criterion performance.
The foregoing argument can be illustrated (rather than formally
proven) in terms of the following fictitious dataset (N = 400)
comprising a normally distributed criterion (Crit_Y)
systematically related to a normally distributed predictor
(Pred_X12). Half the observations are obtained from members of
a protected group (D = 0) and half from members of a non-
protected group (D = 1). The criterion distributions of the two
groups coincide perfectly as shown in Table 1. Scores on the two
variables were generated in SPSS (SPSS, 2005) utilising the
normal density function.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STAISTICS IN RESPECT OF THE PREDICTOR
AND CRITERION DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROTECTED AND
NON-PROTECTED GROUPS
Predictor (Pred_X) Criterion (Crit_Y)
D = 0 N Valid 200 D=0 N Valid 200
Missing 0 Missing 0
Mean 49,039 Mean 146,474
Median 48,753 Median 146,702
Mode 19,370 Mode 43,420
Std. Deviation 10,267 Std. Deviation 33,0796
Variance 105,403 Variance 1094,259
Skewness -0,055 Skewness 0,071
Std. Error of 0,172 Std. Error of 0,172
Skewness Skewness
Kurtosis -0,272 Kurtosis 0,109
Std. Error of 0,342 Std. Error of 0,342
Kurtosis Kurtosis
D = 1 N Valid 200 D=1 N Valid 200
Missing 0 Missing 0
Mean 64,039 Mean 146,475
Median 63,753 Median 146,702
Mode 34,370 Mode 43,42
Std. Deviation 10,267 Std. Deviation 33,0796
Variance 105,403 Variance 1094,259
Skewness -0,055 Skewness 0,071
Std. Error of 0,172 Std. Error of 0,172
Skewness Skewness
Kurtosis -0,272 Kurtosis 0,109
Std. Error of 0,342 Std. Error of 0,342
Kurtosis Kurtosis
The predictor distributions, however, differ in terms of
location only as indicated in Table 1. A standardised 
difference in mean predictor performance of d = 1,461 thus
exists in this case. The standardized difference is obtained 
by subtracting the mean predictor score of the protected
group (D = 0) from the mean predictor score of the non-
protected group (D = 1) and dividing by the within-group
standard deviation (Sackett & Ellingson, 1997). The predictor-
criterion correlation is 0,743 (p < 0,01) in both groups as
shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
WITHIN-GROUP PREDICTOR-CRITERION CORRELATIONS (N=200)
GROUP PRED_X CRIT_Y
D = 0 PRED_X Pearson Correlation 1 0,743
Sig. (1-tailed) . 0,000
CRIT_Y Pearson Correlation 0,743 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0,000 .
D = 1 PRED_X Pearson Correlation 1 0,743
Sig. (1-tailed) . 0,000
CRIT_Y Pearson Correlation 0,743 1
Sig. (1-tailed) 0,000 .
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When selection occurs strict top-down based on the predictor or
based on the estimated criterion performance derived from the
regression of Crit_Y on Pred_X, serious adverse impact results
against the members of the protected group (D = 0). Table 3
depicts the selection ratios for the two groups that would result
from an overall selection ratio of 0,20. The ratio of the
proportion of selectees from the protected group to the
proportion of selectees from the non-protected group amounts
to 0,06666, which clearly fails to meet the four-fifths
requirement of the Uniform Guidelines. These findings agree
with the results Sackett and Ellingson (1997, pp. 710 & 712)
report on the effect of mean predictor differences on the
selection ratio of the protected group.
TABLE 3




GROUP D = 0 Count 195 5 200
% within GROUP 97,5% 2,5% 100,0%
% within Decision 60,9% 6,3% 50,0%
% of Total 48,8% 1,3% 50,0%
D = 1 Count 125 75 200
% within GROUP 62,5% 37,5% 100,0%
% within Decision 39,1% 93,8% 50,0%
% of Total 31,3% 18,8% 50,0%
Total Count 320 80 400
% within GROUP 80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
% within Decision 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
% of Total 80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
The adverse impact created against the protected group would
be considered unfair by the Cleary-model of selection fairness
(Cleary, 1968) because group membership significantly (p <
0,01) explains variance in the criterion, which is not explained
by the predictor, but the current selection strategy fails to take
this fact into account. This results in the significant
underprediction of the criterion performance of the members
of the protected group. The selection decision-rule will
therefore discriminate against members of the protected 
group by placing them too low in the selection rank order. 
This is shown in Table 4 and Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 1
and Figure 2.
TABLE4
DIFFERENCE IN MEAN UNSTANDARDISED (Y-E[Y|X]) BETWEEN
PROTECTED (D = 0) AND NON-PROTECTED (D = 1) GROUPS
N Mean Std. Std. 95% Mini- Maxi-





D = 0 200 11,681 23,757 1,6798 8,368 14,993 -49,268 73,959
D = 1 200 -11,681 23,757 1,6798 -14,993 -8,368 -72,629 50,598
Total 400 ,000 26,452 1,323 -2,600 2,600 -72,629 73,959
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 54573,367 1 54573,367 96,698 0,000
Within Groups 224618,975 398 564,369
Total 279192,342 399
Figure 1: Scatter plot of the unstandardised residuals against
the predictor with group as a plot symbol
Figure 2: Scatter plot of the criterion-predictor relationship
with group membership as plot symbol
The remedy would be to include Group as a main effect in the
prediction model. The regression of Crit_Y on Pred_X and Group
is shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF THE CRITERION ON A
LINEAR PREDICTOR-GROUP COMPOSITE
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
0,743 0,551 0,549 22,183
Predictors: (Constant), GROUP, PRED_X
Dependent Variable: CRIT_Y
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 240166,655 2 120083,327 244,041 0,000
Residual 195348,530 397 492,062
Total 435515,185 399
UnstandardiSed Standardised t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 29,140 5,538 5,262 0,000
PRED_X1 2,393 0,108 0,920 22,093 0,000
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When regressing Crit_Y on Pred_X, only 0,359 of the variance
in the criterion is explained by the predictor or
E[Crit_Y|Pred_X] whereas within groups Pred_X explains
0,551 of the variance in Crit_Y (see Figure 2). On the other
hand, when regressing Crit_Y on Pred_X and Group, 0,551 of
the variance in the criterion is explained by the linear
composite of Pred_X and Group or E[Crit_Y|Pred_X; Group].
The multiple correlation between the criterion and the
weighted linear composite of the predictor and the group
variable is therefore 0,734 (i.e., R[E[Crit_Y|Pred_X;
Group],Crit_Y] = 0,734) (see Table 5). By taking group
membership into account in the prediction model the
systematic group-related under- and over-prediction of
criterion performance is eliminated and as a consequence the
proportion of criterion variance explained is increased.
When selection occurs strict top-down based on the 
estimated criterion performance derived from the regression of
Crit_Y on Pred_X and Group, adverse impact no longer result
against the members of the protected group (D = 0). Table 6
depicts the selection ratios for the two groups that would result
from an overall selection ratio of 0,20. The ratio of the
proportion of selectees from the protected group to the
proportion of selectees from the non-protected group amounts to
1,0, which constitutes perfect compliance with the requirement
of the Uniform Guidelines. The fair use of the predictor (in the
Cleary sense of the term) totally eliminated adverse impact in this
case because the criterion distributions coincide. It could easily
be demonstrated that if the criterion distributions had differed in
terms of location, the fair use of the predictor would have
resulted in fair, acceptable (AERA, APA & NCME, 1999;
Huysamen, 1996; Huysamen, 2001) adverse impact.
TABLE 6




GROUP D = 0 Count 160 40 200
% within GROUP 80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
% within Decision 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
% of Total 40,0% 10,0% 50,0%
D = 1 Count 160 40 200
% within GROUP 80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
% within Decision 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
% of Total 40,0% 10,0% 50,0%
Total Count 320 80 400
% within GROUP 80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
% within Decision 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
% of Total 80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
Developing a clear and unambiguous stance on the meaning of
adverse impact seems to be important from a South African
perspective since the Employment Equity Act (Republic of South
Africa, 1998) and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000) also
seem to assume a shifting burden of persuasion model (Arvey
and Faley, 1988; Dupper, 2002). In Chapter II of the Employment
Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998, p. 16), under the
heading “Burden of proof”, paragraph 11 states:
Whenever unfair discrimination is alleged in terms of this
Act, the employer against whom the allegation is made must
establish that it is fair.
In Chapter 3 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000, p. 8),
again under the heading “Burden of proof”, paragraph 13 states:
1. If the complainant makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination13.
a) the respondent must prove, on the facts before the 
court, that the discrimination did not take place as alleged:
or
b) the respondent must prove that the conduct is not based
on one or more of the prohibited grounds
2. If the discrimination did take place-
a) on a ground in paragraph (a) of the definition of
“prohibited grounds” then it is unfair, unless the
respondent proves that the discrimination is fair;
b) on a ground in paragraph (b) of the definition of
“prohibited grounds” then it is unfair-
i) if one or more of the conditions set out in paragraph
(b) of the definition of “prohibited grounds”14 is
established; and
ii) unless the respondent proves that the discrimination is
fair.
The rather intricate nature of the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act’s (Republic of South
Africa, 2000) position of the burden of persuasion resting on the
defendant/respondent further underlines the necessity of
clarifying in practical terms exactly how a prima facie case of
(indirect) discrimination will be established. In the case of both
acts the question moreover arises how the respondent can prove
that a selection procedure that discriminates against individuals
from a protected group (i.e., the procedure imposes a burden or
disadvantage on such members or it withholds opportunities
from them reflected in a lower probability of being selected) is
in fact fair? Clarity on neither of these two issues seems to have
been reached in the legal fraternity in South Africa (Bonthuys,
2002; Dupper, 2002; Landman, 2002).
Personnel selection procedures would nonetheless want to
minimise adverse impact, not only in order to avoid litigation,
but to ensure that access to job opportunities are distributed
across groups in the labour market in proportion to the size of
the various groupings and to optimally utilise the human
recourses available in the labour market. In an ideal world one
would want to share job opportunities amongst protected and
non-protected groups in proportion to their presence in the
labour market. It should also be acknowledged that
organisations face the very real demand to increase the
diversity of their workforce so as to mirror the composition of
the community more closely (Sackett et al., 2001). The same is
true for institutions of higher learning with regards to the
composition of their student bodies.
When the criterion distributions of protected and non-protected
groups coincide, it is possible to use a valid predictor fairly to
maximise the utility of the selection procedure while avoiding
adverse impact. However, when systematic differences in the
criterion distributions exist it no longer is possible to achieve all
four objectives simultaneously. If selection decisions are fair in
terms of the Cleary-interpretation of fairness and selection occurs
strictly top-down based on E[Y|X1; Di], then utility will be
maximised, but adverse impact will now be unavoidable. The
objective of minimising adverse impact could be satisfied through
quotas or criterion referenced race norming, but only if the utility
objective is sacrificed. The sacrifice required by top-down hiring
within each group (criterion-referenced race norming) would
depend on the magnitude of the difference in the criterion
distributions. According to Schmidt and Hunter (1981, p. 1130):
… selection systems based on top-down hiring within each
group completely eliminates “adverse impact” at a much
smaller price in lowered productivity. Such systems typically
yield 85% to 95% of the productivity gains attainable with
optimal nonpreferential use of selection tests.
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13 The definition of discrimination held by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000) was quoted earlier in the manuscript. 14
“prohibited grounds” are – (a) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth;
or (b) any other grounds where discrimination based on that other ground – (i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; (ii) undermines human dignity; or (iii) adversely affects the equal
enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a) (Republic of South Africa, 2000, p. 5).
Meta-analytic summaries of criterion differences in the United
States indicate a 0,30 standard deviation difference in mean
protected and non-protected group criterion performance
(Sackett & Roth, 1996). To the extent that similar conditions
would exist in South Africa criterion-referenced race norming
presents itself as a viable strategy to combat adverse impact.
Three considerations, however, argue against a blind reliance on
within-group top-down selection. A drop in utility of 5% to 15%
can be substantial when projected over number of selectees,
time and successive cohorts (Boudreau, 1991). More importantly,
however, to solely rely on within-group top-down selection
would leave the root causes of the performance imbalance,
which fundamentally underlies adverse impact, untreated.
Moreover, the difference in mean criterion performance
amongst protected and non-protected groups in South Africa
could be substantially greater than in the United States.
Criterion-referenced race norming under these conditions would
result in a more severe drop in utility than anticipated by
Schmidt and Hunter (1981). 
Increasing the weights of the work performance dimensions less
susceptible to ethnic or gender differences and decreasing the
weights associated with dimensions on which larger differences
exist would also reduce adverse impact on the composite
criterion (De Corte, 1999; Hattrup, Rock & Scalia, 1997). The
weighing of performance dimensions should, however, only
reflect the relative importance of the various competencies in
achieving the objective for which the job exists. The
manipulation of criterion composite weights, therefore, does not
offer a meaningful solution to the problem of adverse impact
(Sackett et al., 2001).
The realisation that adverse impact in criterion referenced
personnel selection cannot be avoided by the judicious choice of
selection instruments is by no means a novel insight. Twenty-
three years ago Schmidt and Hunter (1981, pp.1131 & 1134)
already declared:
These findings show that tests do not cause “adverse impact”
against minorities. The cumulative research on test fairness
shows that the average ability and cognitive skill differences
between groups are directly reflected in job performance and
thus are real. They are not created by tests. … But the solution
to the problem (of adverse impact) cannot begin until the
problem is faced in an intellectually honest way. It is not
intellectually honest, in the face of empirical evidence to the
contrary, to postulate that the problem is biased and/or
invalid employment tests.
Although it would not be intellectually honest to ultimately
attribute the problem of adverse impact on biased selection
instruments and/or unfair selection decision-making (Schmidt &
Hunter, 1981) and although performance can be maximised
fairly (within the current reality) despite adverse impact, the
problem of adverse impact can nonetheless not simply be
ignored. How the human resource function should respond to
the problem of adverse impact in selection would depend on
why the systematic differences in criterion distributions exist.
This is a question that is not raised often enough by human
resource management professionals when contemplating the
appropriate response to the dilemma outlined above. This
question is, however, critically important since remedial actions
will only succeed if they deal with the root cause of the problem.
In the South African context it does not seem unreasonable to
attribute at least some part of the systematic group-related
differences in criterion distributions to a socio-political system
that systematically denied the members of specific groups the
opportunity to develop and acquire those crystallised abilities
required to succeed on the criterion. Psychological tests that
report standardised mean score differences between ethnic
groups on especially measures of cognitive abilities should
therefore not be characterised as villains responsible for the
problem but rather as unbiased messengers relatively accurately
conveying the consequences of a tragic social system. The
solution therefore is not to be found in strategies to convince the
messenger to alter its message as is seemingly suggested by
Hough et al. (2001) and Sackett et al. (2001). The difference in
criterion distributions observed between protected and non-
protected groups reflect bona fide differences on numerous
critical dispositions and attainments (Schmidt & Hunter, 1981;
Saville & Holdsworth, 2000; 2001) required to succeed in the
world of work, which have resulted from the systemic denial of
access to developmental opportunities. To deny the criterion
differences and the differences in the underlying competency
potential (Saville & Holdsworth 2000; 2001) is to deny the
history that caused it. The solution rather lies in affirmative
development interventions aimed at developing those
attainments and dispositions needed to succeed on the criterion.
This puts the assessment of learning potential centre-stage. 
SUMMARY
The objective of personnel selection is to add value to
organisations by maximising the performance of employees by
regulating the quality of employees moving into, up and out of
the organisation. The criterion construct is therefore the focus of
interest in personnel selection. Direct information on the
criterion construct is, however, not available at the time of the
selection decision. Selection decisions are therefore based on
expected criterion performance or the conditional probability of
success. Such decision-making can be considered fair to the
extent that members of protected and non-protected groups
with the same probability of success on the job have the same
probability of obtaining the job. This will be the case to the
extent to which there is no systematic group-related (prediction)
bias in the expected criterion performance or the conditional
probability of success. Selection fairness therefore cannot be
assured solely through the careful development or judicious
choice of selection instruments. Measurement bias can be
avoided through the careful development or judicious choice of
selection instruments. Unfair discrimination in personnel
selection, however, cannot be avoided through the use of
reliable, valid and (scale) unbiased selection instruments. Fair
(i.e., non-discriminatory) selection can in the final analysis only
be assured by determining whether group membership
systematically affects any of the parameters defining the
regression of the criterion on the predictors and appropriately
accounting for the group effect in the selection decision rule.
Assessment techniques for this reason also cannot be certified as
Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998)
compliant. Adverse impact, finally, cannot be avoided through
the careful development or judicious choice of selection
instruments. Selection instruments cannot be graded in terms of
the degree of their adverse impact. In the final analysis, adverse
impact resides in differences in the criterion distributions of
protected and non-protected groups. Adverse impact cannot be
equated with unfair discrimination. In as far as unfair
discrimination most likely (although not necessarily) will result
in adverse impact, the latter can be regarded as prima facie
evidence of unfair discrimination. Adverse impact will most
likely result from fair selection procedures in South Africa if a
strict top-down selection strategy is followed because of
systematic differences in the criterion distributions of protected
and non-protected groups. Organisations in South Africa can
(and probably in the interim have to) choose to avoid adverse
impact through quotas because they value work force diversity
more than the drop in utility produced by the deviation from
strict top-down selection based on fairly derived expected
criterion performance. In a country like South Africa where the
difference in average criterion performance (i.e. adverse impact)
is a legacy of an artificial socio-political situation, it would,
however, be a pity not also to address the fundamental causes
underlying adverse impact. In the final analysis it is the
differences in developmental opportunity and the resultant
THERON114
differences in the attainments and dispositions that drive
performance that should be dealt with. Aggressive investment in
affirmative development interventions seems the only truly
honest (Schmidt & Hunter, 1981) way of dealing with the labour
market legacy of our previous political dispensation. This will
present numerous exiting and stimulating challenges to the I/O
psychology fraternity in South Africa. First amongst these would
probably be to develop a comprehensive performance@learning
structural model (Saville & Holdsworth, 2000; 2001) that
explicates the manner in which critical learning dispositions and
attainments map onto critical learning competencies (Taylor,
1994) and how these in turn relate to job performance
dispositions and attainments and ultimately job competencies.
Deriving an appropriate affirmative development selection
battery from the model to identify those previously
disadvantaged individuals that would maximally benefit from an
affirmative development opportunity seems to present a second
important challenge (Taylor, 1994). Deriving appropriate
interventions from the model aimed at maximising transfer of
training probably represents a third critical challenge.
Additional challenges with regards to training content, learning
strategies and training delivery also exist.
The broad psychometric position in which the predictor is the
primary villain responsible for most if not all of the evils
associated with personnel selection from a diverse applicant
pool is therefore not a psychometrically justified one that best
serves the interests of all stakeholders involved. More to the
point, it will not assure that the commendable vision formulated
by then president Mandela in the preamble to the Employment
Equity Bill (Republic of South Africa, 1996) will be achieved. It
is, moreover, probably a very natural psychological reaction to
target an explicit scapegoat to be blamed and sacrificed for the
selection sins committed during the pre-equity legislation era in
South Africa. However, when the ill-fated scapegoat is
erroneously being perceived as the true culprit without any
honest confession on the part of the real sinner, more harm is
being done than good. It is the decision-maker who must
shoulder the final responsibility for what went wrong in the past
and for complying with the spirit and the letter of the
Employment Equity Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) in
future. And on a more personal note, it is me who must ask
myself why I had so little to say about employment equity before
it was forced upon me by the newly written Constitution and
the legislation that was enacted in terms of it, despite the
extensive available literature on the topic (e.g. Bartlett et al.,
1978; Cleary, 1968; EEOC, 1978; Petersen & Novick, 1976).
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
It is crucial that human resource management professionals
involved in personnel selection should move beyond the
popular rhetoric on the use of psychological tests in personnel
selection and engage in an open (Louw, 1965), honest and
penetrating debate on the interplay between past injustices,
measurement bias, selection fairness, adverse impact and
selection utility. However, open, honest and penetrating
debate, in and by itself, will not achieve the extremely laudable
vision formulated by former president Mandela in the
preamble to the Employment Equity Bill (Republic of South
Africa, 1996, p. 5). The courage to act on the convictions
emerging from the debate is what will ultimately bring us
closer to realising the vision. 
The argument presented above, and the approach to practical
psychological assessment it implies, could be criticised as
unrealistically empirical and actuarial. Undeniably the approach
advocated here would pose severe practical, technical and
logistical challenges to the human resource management
professional. However, if there is some psychometric merit in the
argument outlined above, could the Industrial-Organisational
Psychology and Psychology fraternities not rise to the challenge
of finding creative and innovative solutions to the obstacles that
currently prevent the widespread implementation of an actuarial
approach to personnel selection (Mossholder & Arvey, 1984)?
The development of a generic individual performance structural
model and an accompanying individual performance index,
analogous to the Theron, Spangenberg and Henning (2004) unit
performance structural model and Performance Index
(Spangenberg & Theron, 2004) in conjunction with synthetic
validity procedures (Guion, 1998; Mossholder & Arvey, 1984),
cross-industry cooperation, validity generalisation analysis
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1977) and possibly bootstrapping
procedures (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993) could be explored as
possible solutions.
REFERENCES
Abrahams, F. & Mauer, R. (1999). The comparability of the
constructs of the 16PF in the South African context. Journal
of Industrial Psychology, 25, 53-59.
American Educational Research Association, American
Psychological Association & National Council on
Measurement in Education. (1999). Standards for educational
and psychological testing. Washington D.C, NY: Author.
Arvey, R.D. & Faley, R.H. (1988). Fairness in selecting employees
(Second edition). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Austin, J.T. & Villanova, P. (1992). The criterion problem: 1917-
1992. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 836-874.
Bartlett, C.J., Bobko, P., Mosier, S.B. & Hannan, R. (1978). Testing
for fairness with a moderated multiple regression strategy:
an alternative to differential analysis. Personnel Psychology,
31, 233-242.
Bartram, D., Baron, H. & Kurz, R. (2003). Let’s turn validation on
its head. Occupational Psychology Conference of the British
Psychological Society Bournemouth.
Berenson, M.L, Levine, D.M & Goldstein, M. (1983). Intermediate
statistical methods and applications. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Binning, J.F. & Barrett, G.V. (1989). Validity of Personnel
decisions: a conceptual analysis of the inferential and
evidential bases. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 478-494.
Bonthuys, E. (2002). Counting flying pigs: psychometric testing
and the law. Industrial Law Journal, 23, 1175-1194.
Boudreau, J.W. (1989). Selection utility analysis: a review and
agenda for further research. In M. Smith & I. Robertson (Eds.).
Advances in selection and assessment. Chichester: John
Wiley.
Boudreau, J.W. (1991). Utility analysis for decisions in human
resource management. In M.D. Dunnette & L.M. Hough
(Eds.). Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology
(Second edition; Volume 2). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting
Psychologists Press.
Bredell, B., van Eeden, R. & van Staden, F. (1999). Culture as a
moderator variable in psychological test performance: issues
and trends in South Africa. Journal of Industrial Psychology,
25, 1-7.
Brogden, H.E. (1946). On the interpretation of the correlation
coefficient as a measure of predictive efficiency. Journal of
Education and Psychology, 37, 65-76. 
Brogden, H.E. (1949a). When testing pays off. Personnel
Psychology, 2, 171-185. 
Brogden, H.E. (1949b). A new coefficient: application to biserial
correlation and to estimation of selective efficiency.
Psychometrika, 14, 169-182.
Byrne, B.M. (1998). Structural equation modelling with LISREL,
PRESLIS and SIMPLIS: basic concepts, applications, and
programming. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum.
Cascio, W.F. (1991a). Applied psychology in personnel management.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.
Cascio, W.F. (1991b). Costing human resources; the financial
impact of behavior in organizations. Boston, MA: PWS-Kent
Publishing Company.
PSYCHOMETRIC TESTING AND THE LAW 115
Chan, D. & Schmitt, N. (1997). Video-based versus paper-
and-pencil method of assessment in situational judge-
ment tests: sub-group differences in test performance 
and face validity perceptions. Journal of Applied Psychology,
82, 143-159.
Cleary, T.A. (1968). Test bias: prediction of grades of Negro and
white students in integrated colleges. Journal of Educational
Measurement, 5, 115-124.
Cochran, W.G. (1951). Improvement by means of selection. In J.
Neyman (Ed.), Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium
on Mathematical Statistics and Probability (pp.449-470).
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Cronbach, L. J., & Gleser, G. C. (1965). Psychological tests and
personnel decisions (2nd ed.). Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois
Press.
Cronshaw, S.F. & Alexander, R.A. (1985). One answer to the
demand for accountability: selection utility as an investment
decision. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 35, 102-118.
Dawes, R.M. (1971). A case study of graduate admissions:
application of three principles of human decision making.
American Psychologist, 26, 180-188.
Dawes, R.M. & Corrigan, B. (1974). Linear models in decision
making. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 95-106.
De Beer, M. (2000). The construction and evaluation of a dynamic
computerized adaptive test for the measurement of learning
potential. Unpublished D.Litt et Phil dissertation. University
of South Africa, Pretoria
De Corte, W. (1999). Weighing job performance predictors to
both maximize the quality of the selected work force and
control the level of adverse impact. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 84, 695-702.
Diamantopoulos, A. & Siguaw, J.A. (2000). Introducing LISREL; a
guide for the uninitiated. London: Sage Publications.
Drasgow, F. & Parsons, C.K. (1983). Applications of uni-
dimensional item response theory models to
multidimensional data. Applied Psychological Measurement, 7,
189-199.
Drasgow, F. & Hulin, C.L. (1990). Item response theory. In M.D.
Dunnette & L.M. Hough (Eds.). Handbook of industrial and
organizational psychology (Second edition). Palo Alto, CA:
Consulting Psychologists Press.
Dupper, O. (2002). The burden of proof in US employment
discrimination law: any lessons for South Africa. Industrial
Law Journal, 23, 1143-1155.
Efron, B.S. & Tibshirani, R.J. (1993). An introduction to the
bootstrap. New York, NY: Chapman and Hall.
Einhorn, H.J. & Bass, A.R. [1971]. Methodological considerations
relevant to discrimination in employment testing.
Psychological Bulletin, 75 , 261-269.
Ellis, M.V. & Blustein, D.L. (1991). Developing and using
educational and psychological tests and measures: the
unificationist perspective. Journal of Counseling and
Development, 69, 550-555.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (1978). Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. 29 C.F.R. 
1607.
Gatewood, R.B. & Feild, H.S. (1994). Human resource selection (3rd
ed.). Fort Worth, TX: Dryden.
Ghiselli, E.E., Campbell, J.P. & Zedeck, S. (1981). Measurement
theory for the behavioural sciences. San Francisco, CA:
Freeman and Company.
Goldberg, L. R. (1970). Man versus model of man: a rationale
plus evidence for a method of improving on clinical
inferences. Psychological Bulletin, 73, 422-432.
Grove, W.M. & Meehl, P.E. (1996). Comparative efficiency of
informal (subjective, impressionistic) and formal
(mechanical, algorithmic) prediction procedures: the
clinical- statistical controversy. Psychology, Public Policy, and
Law, 2, 293-323.
Guion, R.M. (1966). Employment tests and discriminatory
hiring. Industrial Relations, 5, 20-37.
Guion, R.M. (1991). Personnel assessment, selection and
placement. In M.D. Dunnette & L.M. Hough (Eds.).
Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (2nd ed.;
Volume 2). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Guion, R.M. (1998). Assessment, measurement and prediction for
personnel decisions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Hattrup, K., Rock, J. & Scalia, C. (1997). The effects of varying
conceptualisations of job performance on adverse impact,
minority hiring and predictor performance. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 82, 656-664.
Hough, L.M., Oswald, F.L. & Ployhart (2001). Determinants,
detection and amelioration of adverse impact in personnel
selection procedures: issues evidence and lessons learned.
International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 9, 152-194.
Humpreys L.G. (1986). An analysis and evaluation of test and
item bias in the prediction context. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 71, 327-333.
Hunter, J.E. & Schmidt, F.L. (1976). Critical analysis of the
statistical and ethical implications of various definitions of
test bias. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 1053-1071.
Hunter, J.E. & Schmidt, F.L. (2000). Racial and gender bias in
ability and achievement tests: resolving the apparent
paradox. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 6, 151-158.
Huysamen, G.K. (1995). The applicability of fair selection
models in the South African context. Journal of Industrial
Psychology, 21, 1-6.
Huysamen, G.K. (1996). The socio-political context of the
application of fair selection models in the USA. Journal of
Industrial Psychology, 22, 1-6.
Huysamen, G.K. (2002). The relevance of the new APA standards
for educational and psychological testing for employment
testing in South Africa. South African Journal of Psychology,
32, 26-33.
Kanjee, A. (2001). Cross-cultural test adaptation and translation.
In C. Foxcroft & G. Roodt (Eds.). An introduction to
psychological assessment in the South African context. Cape
Town: Oxford University Press.
Kleinbaum, D.G. & Kupper, L.L. (1978). Applied regression analysis
and other multivariate methods. North Sciituate, MA:
Duxbury Press.
Kleinmutz, B. (1990). Why we still use our heads instead of
formulas: towards an integrative approach. Psychological
Bulletin, 107, 296-310.
Landman, A.A. (2002). Tweaking the scales-reflections on the
burden of proof in SA labour discrimination law. Industrial
Law Journal, 23, 1133-1142.
Landy, F.J. (1986). Stamp collecting versus science; validation as
hypothesis testing. American Psychologist, 41, 1183-1192.
Lawsche, C.H. & Balma, M.J. (1966). Principles of personnel testing.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Lopes, A., Roodt, G. & Mauer, R. (2001). The predictive validity
of the APIL-B in a financial institution. Journal of Industrial
Psychology, 27, 61-69.
Louw, N.P.van Wyk. (1965). Die oop gesprek. In E. Botha (Ed.).
Afrikaanse essayiste. Cape Town. Human & Rousseau.
Maxwell, S.E. & Arvey, R.D. (1993). The search for predictors with
high validity and low adverse impact; compatible or
incompatible goals? Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 433-437.
Meehl, P. E. (1954). Clinical vs. statistical prediction: a theoretical
analysis and a review of the evidence. Minneapolis, MI:
University of Minnesota Press.
Meehl, P. E. (1957). When shall we use our heads instead of the
formula? Journal of Counseling Psychology, 4, 268-273.
Mels, G. (2003). A workshop on structural equation modeling with
LISREL 8.54 for Windows. Chicago, Ill: Scientific Software
International.
Messick, S. (1989). Validity. In R.L. Linn (Ed.). Educational
measurement (Third edition). New York, NY: American
Council on Education and McMillan Publishing Company.
Milkovich, G.T. & Boudreau, J.W. (1994). Human resource
management (Seventh edition). Homewood, Ill: Richard D.
Irwin.
THERON116
Millsap, R.E. & Everson, H.T. (1993). Methodological review:
statistical approaches for assessing measurement bias.
Applied Psychological Measurement, 17, 297-334.
Mossholder, K.W. & Arvey, R.D. (1984). Synthetic validity: a
conceptual and comparative review. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 69, 322-333.
Murphy, K.R. and Davidshofer, C.O. (1988). Psychological testing:
principles and applications. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Naylor, J.C. & Shine, L.C. (1965). A table for determining the
increase in mean criterion score obtained by using a
selection device. Journal of Industrial Psychology, 3, 33-42.
Petersen, N.S. & Novick, M.R. (1976). An evaluation of some
models for culture fair selection. Journal of Educational
Measurement, 13, 3-29.
Pulakos, E.D. & Schmitt, N. (1996). An evaluation of two
strategies for reducing adverse impact and their effects on
criterion-related validity. Human Performance, 9, 241-258.
Republic of South Africa. (1996). Employment Equity Bill.
Government Gazette, 390 (18481). Cape Town, 1 December.
Republic of South Africa. (1998). Employment equity act.
Government Gazette, 400 (19370), Cape Town, 19 October.
Republic of South Africa. (2000). Promotion of equality and
prevention of unfair discrimination Act. Government Gazette,
416 (20876), Cape Town, 9 February.
Sackett, P.R. & Ellingson, J.E. (1997). The effects of forming
multi-predictor composites on group differences and
adverse impact. Personnel Psychology, 50, 707-721.
Sackett, P.R. & Roth, L. (1996). Multi-stage selection strategies: a
monte carlo investigation of effects on performance and
minority hiring. Personnel Psychology, 49, 549-572.
Sackett, P.R. & Wilk, S.L. (1994). Within-group norming and
other forms of score adjustment in preemployment testing.
American Psychologist, 49, 929-954.
Sackett, P.R., Schmitt, N., Elligson, J.E. & Kabin, M.B. (2001).
High stakes testing in employment, credentialing, and
higher education; prospects in a post-affirmative-action
world. American Psychologist, 56, 302-318.
Saville & Holdsworth. (2000). Competency design; towards an
integrated human resource management system. SHL
Newsline, March, 7-8.
Saville & Holdsworth. (2001). Competencies and
performance@work, SHL Newsline, May,6.
Schaap, P. & Basson, J.S. (2003). The construct equivalence of the
PIB/SPEEX motivation index for job applicants from diverse
cultural backgrounds. SA Journal of Industrial Psychology, 29,
49-59.
Schaap, P. (2003). The construct comparability of the PIB/SPEEX
stress index for job applicants from diverse cultural groups
in South Africa. South African Journal of Psychology, 33, 95-
102.
Schaap, P. (2001)Determining differential item functioning and
its effect on the test scores of selected PIB indexes, using item
response theory techniques. Journal of Industrial Psychology,
27, 32-38.
Schmidt, F.L. & Hunter, J.E. (1977). Development of a general
solution to the problem of validity generalization. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 62, 529-540.
Schmidt, F.L. & Hunter, J.E. (1981). Employment testing; old
theories and new research findings. American Psychologist, 36,
1128-1137.
Schmitt, N, Rogers, W, Chan, D, Sheppard, L. & Jennings, D.
(1997). Adverse impact and predictive efficiency of various
predictor combinations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82,
719-730.
Schmitt, N. (1989). Fairness in employment selection. In M.
Smith & I. Robertson (Eds.). Advances in selection and
assessment. Chichester: John Wiley.
Singer, M. (1993). Fairness in personnel selection. Avebury:
Aldershot.
Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. (2003).
Principles for the validation and use of personnel selection
procedures. Bowling Green: Author.
Society for Industrial Psychology. (1998). Guidelines for the
validation and use of assessment procedures for the workplace.
Aucklandpark:Author.
Spangenberg, H.H. & Theron, C.C. (2004). Development of a
questionnaire for assessing work unit performance. SA
Journal of Industrial Psychology, 30, 19-28.
SPSS (2005). SPSS 13.0 for Windows. SPSS Inc.
http://www.spss.com.
Taylor, H.C. & Russell, J.T. (1939). The relationship of validity
coefficients to the practical effectiveness of tests in selection:
discussion and tables. Journal of Applied Psychology, 23, 565-
578
Taylor, T.R. (1994). A review of three approaches to cognitive
assessment, and proposed integrated approach based on a
unifying theoretical framework. South African Journal of
Psychology, 24, 184-193.
Theron, C.C., Spangenberg, H.H. & Henning, R. (2004). An
elaboration of the internal structure of the unit performance
construct as measured by the performance index (PI).
Management Dynamics, 13, 35-52
Van der Merwe, R.P. (1999). Psychological assessment in industry.
Journal of Industrial Psychology, 25, 8-11.
Van der Merwe, R.P. (2002). Psychometric testing and human
resource management. SA Journal of Industrial Psychology, 28,
77-86.
Van Zyl, E. & Visser, D. (1998). Differential item functioning in
the Figure Classification test. Journal of Industrial Psychology,
24, 25-33.
Vandenberg, R.J. & Lance, C.E. (2000). A review and synthesis of
the measurement invariance literature: suggestions, practices
and recommendations for organizational research.
Organizational Research Methods, 3, 4-70.
Visser, D. & De Jong, A. (2000). Black and white employees’
fairness perceptions of personnel selection techniques.
South African Journal of Psychology, 30, 17-24.
Wiggins, J.S. (1973). Personality and prediction: principles of
personality assessment. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
PSYCHOMETRIC TESTING AND THE LAW 117
